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Strategic Activism: The Rainforest Action Network

The Rainforest Action Network (RAN) worked “to protect the Earth's rainforests and support the rights of their inhabitants through education, grassroots organizing, and nonviolent direct action.”¹ RAN accomplished its mission by organizing campaigns to redirect corporations away from the destruction and exploitation of non-sustainable forest resources. RAN worked with other non-governmental organization (NGOs), student groups, and indigenous forest communities. Founded in 1985, RAN had 10,000 members and an annual budget of \$2.0 million in 2003.

Over time, the scope of RAN's campaigns had broadened. RAN sought to stop the logging of old growth forests, protect fragile ecosystems, and reduce the threat to forests and the environment due to climate change. RAN's three campaigns in 2004—the Old Growth Campaign, the Global Finance Campaign, and Jumpstart Ford—focused on these objectives.

In April 2003, RAN's board of directors appointed as executive director Michael Brune, the former campaigns director for the organization. Brune and the board of directors began a review of RAN's strategy and mission in light of the expanded scope of RAN's campaigns. RAN had limited resources and was stretched to conduct three campaigns. If RAN were to expand its mission, for example, to include natural systems, such as clean air, clean water, and the climate, more broadly, what changes to RAN's strategy, structure, and resource base would be required?

RAN BACKGROUND

In pursuing its mission to protect the Earth's rainforests and the rights of their inhabitants, RAN initially had emphasized public education, education of schoolchildren, and solidarity with indigenous peoples by taking direct action to stop specific activities it deemed destructive. RAN also addressed regulatory issues. RAN used “Action Alerts” (messages sent through the mail,

¹ www.ran.org, May 11, 2004.

Research Associate Erin Yurday, Cornell MBA 1998, prepared this case under the supervision of David P. Baron, David S. and Ann M. Barlow Professor of Political Economy and Strategy, as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

This case would not have been possible without the help of Michael Brune, James Gollin, Michael Klein, and Jacob Harold.

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and later, the Internet) to educate the public about issues and encourage people to send letters to the companies it targeted.

RAN's campaigns were often in direct support of indigenous communities or in direct opposition to specific projects. RAN would attempt to stop a company from carrying out a specific project but would not try to change the overall policies of the company to stop similar projects. For instance, RAN campaigned to drive Conoco out of the rainforests of Ecuador, rather than drive Conoco out of endangered ecosystems worldwide. Although it was often successful in stopping destructive activities, such as a logging operation or road building, RAN was only stopping individual projects. RAN had some successful campaigns, such as convincing Burger King to stop selling rainforest beef, but Brune said, "RAN was losing the bigger battle and definitely losing the war."

In the mid-1990s, RAN had as many as 16 different program cost centers for its many campaign projects, and with about the same number of employees RAN recognized that it did not have the resources to effectively run its many campaigns. The board of directors, headed by Michael Klein, led a strategy review that resulted in RAN focusing on market campaigns and decreasing the number of campaigns in its portfolio. Going forward, campaigns would be broader in scope—not focusing on a specific road or plant that RAN considered destructive, but on the policies of a company, and eventually its industry. For greater impact, RAN decided to target companies with established brands. RAN gradually consolidated activities into two main campaigns—the Old Growth Campaign and Beyond Oil.

RAN also de-emphasized educating the public, taking it as given that the public wanted to protect the environment. Klein said, "The amount of information on the environment is overwhelming. I still don't know if paper or plastic cups are better. Instead of trying to educate the public on this, like many other NGOs, we think it's easier to just tell people who the bad guy is." RAN also decided not to work as much on the ground with indigenous people. Klein said, "Your work is never done, and there is no exit strategy. We decided RAN would help indigenous people the most by addressing American consumption."

At the time, RAN also transitioned executive directors. Founder and executive director Randy Hayes resigned as executive director in 1997 but remained on the board.² He was replaced by Kelly Quirke, who a few years later left RAN and was replaced by Christopher Hatch. In April 2003, the board named Michael Brune as RAN's fourth executive director.

MICHAEL BRUNE

After graduating from West Chester University in 1993, Brune joined Greenpeace, where he became its public outreach director. In 1997 he joined the Coastal Rainforest Coalition (CRC, which later became Forest Ethics), an affiliate of RAN at the time.³ CRC organized corporate campaigns against the logging industry. At CRC Brune contacted *Fortune 500* companies, encouraging them not to buy products from old growth forests. After a year, two dozen companies had agreed not to buy paper or wood from old growth forests. After this success, Brune joined RAN in August 1998 as director of RAN's recently begun Old Growth Campaign.

² In 2004, Hayes was president of RAN. He was not involved in day-to-day activities but represented RAN at conferences, helped with fundraising, and participated in public speaking engagements.

³ http://www.certificationwatchconference.org/speakers_bios_van2004.htm.

Brune's previous work at the CRC gave RAN a toehold to target companies like Home Depot and Lowe's.

RAN'S POSITION AMONG NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

NGOs were private, non-profit organizations that typically focused on development, the environment, and human rights. Their activities included research, information distribution, training, community service, legal advocacy, public pressure, and civil disobedience. NGOs ranged in size from just a few people with a particular cause to national and international organizations with huge memberships.⁴

Size

RAN was significantly smaller than its more widely known peers.

	Year	Revenues	Assets	Year	Members/Supporters
RAN	2002	\$2.3 million	\$1.6 million	2004	10,000
The Sierra Club	2002	\$85 million	\$45 million	2004	700,000
The Nature Conservancy	2003	\$668 million	\$3.7 billion	2004	1 million
Greenpeace	2002	€165 million	€122 million	2004	2.8 million

Although RAN and Greenpeace had similar styles, Greenpeace was a larger, international, and membership based organization.

Radicals?

RAN characterized itself as a “responsible radical.” Among the thousands of groups working for environmental and human rights, RAN was a radical organization, but one of the most stable and mainstream of such groups. Organizations more radical than RAN included anti-globalization and anti-capitalism groups such as EarthFirst! and the Earth Liberation Front, which in five years carried out over 100 acts of violence, causing \$37 million worth of damage, and was classified by the FBI as the leading domestic terror threat.⁵ RAN, on the other hand, described itself as a peaceful organization and denounced violent activity. More mainstream NGOs than RAN included The World Wildlife Fund, the Sierra Club, and The Nature Conservancy.

Public Politics or Private Politics?

Historically, most NGOs targeted governments to change public policy. RAN was one of the first organizations solely to target corporations to change private policies that it viewed as destructive to the environment and, in particular, rainforests. RAN differed from many other radical NGOs that used aggressive corporate campaigns, in that it was willing to work with its target companies to find economically feasible ways for companies to meet its demands. Although RAN's demands might result in higher costs for a company, Klein said, “RAN is not out to hurt corporations. If the playing field is leveled across an industry, then corporations can still thrive and be successful.”

⁴ www2.ucsc.edu/atlas/glossary.html; bch-cbd.naturalsciences.be/belgium/glossary/glos_n.htm, May 17, 2004.

⁵ <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/elf010130.html>;
http://www.earthliberationfront.com/library/elf_faq.pdf, May 10, 2004.

RAN, however, was sometimes accused of being anti-capitalist. George Landrith, executive director of the Frontiers of Freedom Institute,⁶ called RAN “fundamentally radical, anti-capitalist and lawless.”⁷

RAN understood the importance of the marketplace and felt that change could better be achieved through corporations than government—once industry leaders changed their practices, they would pressure government to change regulations to level the playing field. Brune said:

The unique role of RAN is that while we engage in marches, banner hangs, and so on, we are not at the outside—we also sit with CEOs and negotiate agreements with the largest companies of the world. I’m as likely to give interviews to *The Wall Street Journal* as the *EarthFirst! Journal*.

Jacob Harold, who was hired to launch RAN’s Jumpstart Ford campaign, said, “RAN staff will get arrested one day for an act of civil disobedience and then wear a tie to meet with a CEO the next day. There is only a small set of people able to do this.” Brune had been arrested 11 times, but met with CEOs, such as Charles Prince of Citigroup, to negotiate agreements or discuss implementation.⁸

Campaigns and Commitment

RAN believed that praising a company that had good environmental policies would have little effect in inducing other companies to adopt similar policies. Instead, negative campaigns could catch the attention of the public, the media, and the target. RAN viewed companies with a public image and a strong brand as the most susceptible to its campaign tactics. RAN initiated a campaign with a letter to its target presenting a series of demands (see Exhibit 1). Many of RAN’s campaign tactics were designed to call public attention to companies whose actions and policies RAN deemed destructive. RAN hung banners (“banner hangs”), organized Days of Action, coordinated with other NGOs and student groups, paid for advertisements in publications such as *The New York Times*, and garnered media attention.⁹ (See Exhibit 2 for a selection of actions organized by RAN.) Some of its actions, such as trespassing and blocking access to roads or buildings, broke laws, resulting in arrests of protestors.

RAN differed from many NGOs in the duration of its campaigns. Many NGOs (including RAN before the mid-1990s) organized campaigns that lasted only a few months. RAN now sought to change practices in an entire sector, such as timber, and the changes it sought were often

⁶ According to the Frontiers of Freedom Institute’s ten tenets, “The environment is best protected and preserved where free markets thrive, capitalism is robust, and property rights are respected.”
<http://www.ff.org/about/tentenets.html>, May 13, 2004.

⁷ Glen Martin, “Attack on tax status of environment group—Conservatives ask IRS for new ruling,” www.sfgate.com, June 25, 2001.

⁸ Charges were dropped or dismissed in all 11 cases.

⁹ On a Day of Action anywhere from several dozen to over 100 demonstrations were conducted to raise awareness of an issue. Participants included RAN staff, volunteers, students, members of other NGOs, and concerned citizens. The activities on a Day of Action varied, depending on the campaign. Examples of Day of Action activities included passing out flyers in front of a store, delivering a letter to a store manager, and lockdowns, which could include shutting down a store, hanging banners, and commandeering a store’s intercom system. RAN let local groups decide which activities to carry out.

profound. Because of the scope of its objectives and the dramatic changes demanded, RAN committed three to five years to a campaign.

RAN'S CAMPAIGNS

RAN had organized many campaigns that were successful by its standards. Some of RAN's campaigns, however, were not as successful.

Mitsubishi Campaign

In the 1990s RAN targeted Mitsubishi Corporation's role in rainforest harvesting in Asia. The Mitsubishi Corporation produced industrial products, and to pressure it, RAN targeted the U.S. operations of Mitsubishi Motors and Mitsubishi Electric, which were independent of Mitsubishi Corporation and not involved in the logging.¹⁰ The campaign lasted nearly eight years and resulted in new policies from both Mitsubishi Motors and Mitsubishi Electric and new forestry policies from Al-Pac, a Canadian subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation. RAN did not achieve the comprehensive policy from Mitsubishi Corporation it had sought.

Beyond Oil Campaign

As part of its larger effort targeting the oil industry, in the 1990s RAN tried to protect the indigenous U'wa people from the harmful effects of planned oil exploration and development by Occidental Petroleum in Colombia rainforests. The campaign did not succeed in driving Occidental out of U'wa territory, primarily because of difficulties gaining leverage over Occidental. In addition, RAN had no exit strategy, since stopping Occidental would not solve the problem—in fact, Occidental abandoned its plans but sold the lease to a local company. That company drilled several exploratory wells but did not find oil.

Lessons from the Mitsubishi and Beyond Oil campaigns helped shape RAN's strategy for future campaigns. RAN learned that target selection was crucial—targets with a strong retail presence and brand identity and a “public face” would be much more susceptible to its campaigns.

Old Growth Campaign

RAN was not against all logging but wanted logging to be sustainable. In 1992 RAN asked Home Depot to stop using old growth tropical timber. Little happened until 1997 when RAN initiated the Old Growth Campaign following its strategy review. After two years of the campaign, Home Depot agreed to stop selling wood from old growth forests. Within a year, eight out of the top ten retailers followed suit. RAN then focused on the American home construction industry, and within six months, convinced three of the top five homebuilders not to build with old growth wood.

In 2000 RAN used its new market leverage to pressure the logging industry itself. Boise Cascade, a market leader in the timber industry, was RAN's next target. Boise countered by writing to RAN's supporters and filing a complaint with the IRS to revoke RAN's 501(c)(3) tax status. Recognizing that its attacks on RAN were ineffective, in 2002 Boise announced a new

¹⁰ Members of the Mitsubishi keiretsu owned approximately 12 percent of Mitsubishi Electric and 46 percent of Mitsubishi Motors.

domestic policy to “no longer harvest timber from old-growth forests in the United States” by 2004.¹¹ By mid-2004 the list of companies agreeing to stop using old growth pulp, paper, and lumber included Home Depot, Boise Cascade, Lowe’s, Kinko’s, 3M, IBM, Hallmark, Hewlett-Packard, among hundreds of others.¹² RAN continued its campaign against other timber companies and forest product retailers, with Weyerhaeuser the next target.

Global Finance Campaign

Projects in extractive industries, such as logging, oil, and mining, were often funded by global financial institutions. In 2000 RAN launched the Global Finance Campaign to try to stop financial companies from funding extractive industries. Its first target was market leader Citigroup. After three years of campaigning, Citigroup began negotiating seriously with RAN.¹³ In January 2004, Citigroup announced new policies to protect certain ecologically sensitive areas. For instance, projects that would significantly degrade critical natural habitats would not be funded (Citigroup would deny funding for commercial logging in tropical rainforests). Immediately after Citigroup’s announcement, RAN sent letters to ten other U.S. banks, which it dubbed The Liquidators, expanding the campaign to the industry. RAN’s strategy was to challenge The Liquidators to adopt policies that went beyond those adopted by Citigroup. It targeted Bank of America and J. P. Morgan Chase, both of which had mergers pending with federal regulators. In May 2004 Bank of America announced policies stronger than those of Citigroup.

RAN’s STRATEGY

Campaign Strategies and Target Selection

As a relatively small NGO with limited resources, RAN required leverage to have impact. RAN gained leverage by selecting as campaign targets large, brand-oriented, U.S.-based, multinational companies that were dominant in their industries. Describing why brand was important, Klein said, “Brand is about customers identifying with a corporation’s set of values. As a result, global winners have, and need to defend, high standards.” RAN did not use the term “boycott” because it was too difficult to demonstrate an effect on sales, just as it was difficult to demonstrate an endorsement effect. RAN instead referred to the impact on brand equity. Nevertheless, it reported that 20,000 people cut up their Citibank credit cards during the Global Finance Campaign.

RAN’s goal was to shift the practices of entire sectors, not just individual companies, so it relied on the ripple effect of targeting a market leader. RAN also tried to select targets that were the largest abuser in the industry, since they were “demonizable.” After succeeding with its initial target, RAN would expand a campaign to include other companies in the industry with the objective of obtaining change throughout the industry.

¹¹ http://www.ran.org/about_ran/programs.html, May 10, 2004.

¹² In the spring of 1997 RAN targeted Kinko’s. Within a few weeks RAN received a letter from Kinko’s stating that RAN’s demands were consistent with Kinko’s environmental policies. In disbelief, RAN called Kinko’s to argue for its demands. Kinko’s was surprised that RAN was calling to argue, since its letter to RAN stated that it agreed with RAN—Kinko’s would take this environmental issue seriously and would stop sourcing from old growth forests.

¹³ See “Anatomy of a Corporate Campaign: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup (A) (B) (C),” GSB Case No. P-42, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.

Tailored Strategies

When formulating strategies for a campaign, RAN tried to understand the mindset of its corporate target—its marketing and customers. Home Depot and Lowe's had very different market strategies for the home improvement market. Brune cited data showing that 70 percent of all home improvement decisions were made by women. Home Depot was oriented toward men. Its stores were busier and more muscular looking, with exposed ceilings, lots of steel, masculine orange colors, narrow aisles, and muted lighting. Home Depot took pride in skid marks on its floors. In contrast, Lowe's was tailored to women—its stores had wider aisles, better lighting, and softer colors, and its advertising was geared to women. RAN designed its campaign advertisements and materials for Lowe's principal clientele. Brune said:

Women support environmental issues more strongly than men, so we knew that Lowe's would be sensitive to environmental pressure from RAN. So although we targeted Home Depot first because it was larger and growing faster, we knew that once Home Depot moved, Lowe's would not only match Home Depot's policies, but try to exceed them. We wanted them to compete against each other on their environmental values and compliance with policies. We expected leapfrogging, and that's exactly what happened.

Lowe's agreed to a new policy before RAN could begin its advertising, so no ads were placed.

Media

Attracting media coverage was essential to pressuring companies and communicating with the public, RAN supporters, and donors. Much of RAN's media attention was "earned"—media coverage that RAN did not pay for, such as press coverage of Days of Action or articles written about campaigns. In addition, RAN paid for advertisements in newspapers and magazines. (See Exhibit 3 for two of RAN's print advertisements.)

Praising Targets

RAN's style of campaigning was different from that of many NGOs. While publicly pressuring the target, RAN sought to negotiate agreements with the company to obtain policy changes that the target company could feasibly implement. After an agreement with a target company, RAN stopped its pressure tactics and publicly praised the target. The full-page advertisement in *The New York Times* praising Citigroup's new policies is presented in Exhibit 4.

Leveraging the Activist Network

RAN leveraged its resources and competencies by working with other NGOs and students groups. Enlisting students was particularly important to RAN's success—students at many universities were eager to participate in its campaigns. Until the late 1990s RAN also had a number of local chapters.

Rainforest Action Groups—Chapters of RAN

Rainforest Action Groups (RAGS) were official but autonomous chapters of RAN. Many had their own 501(c)(3) tax status and did their own fundraising.¹⁴ RAGS coordinated closely with RAN campaigns but also adopted their own agendas. In the late 1990s, RAN decided to phase out RAGS, moving toward a more flexible arrangement. RAN continued to provide leadership to local groups, such as student groups, community groups, and the “Raging Grannies,” that wanted to join campaigns, but there was no longer an organizational relationship with RAN.

Student Groups

RAN campaigners traveled to campuses to spur interest and mobilize student groups. In addition RAN hired organizers from Green Corps, an organization that trained young environmental activists for future leadership.¹⁵ Green Corps organizers were hired on a short-term basis to saturate campuses—educating students, organizing Days of Action, and establishing groups (or relationships with existing student groups) with which RAN could coordinate after the organizers had gone.

Days of Action were also coordinated using “super organizers,” which were affiliated with national student groups such as Free The Planet, the Student Environmental Action Coalition, Students Transforming and Resisting Corporations, and the Sierra Student Coalition. In the summer months, student groups held training programs. RAN provided training on conducting demonstrations, holding press conferences, and designing campaign materials, as well as informational updates on environmentally destructive activities. RAN worked with the student groups to organize Days of Action, which were then promoted by the groups throughout their own networks to boost participation.

Groups participating in RAN campaigns could design their own materials (e.g., banners) or use materials designed by RAN. RAN designed some materials without its logo so that the groups could add their own logos.

Work with Other NGOs

RAN typically engaged in grassroots activism to spur its corporate negotiations and often worked with other NGOs, in a loosely coordinated but complementary manner. For instance, RAN would cite egregious wood sales from the Amazon or Congo Basin, while other organizations would push to create a demand for potential alternatives, such as certified, ecologically sustainable wood products. RAN and a cooperating NGO usually would not include both their logos on the same fact sheets or press releases nor sit together when negotiating with a target. RAN and other NGOs, however, often consulted informally, discussed tactics on conference calls, or coordinated certain campaign activities.

RAN worked with a diverse coalition to support its long-term campaign goals. Many of its campaign partners had similar long-term objectives and worked in close collaboration with RAN on its campaigns. Other organizations, such as the World Wildlife Fund, World Resources Institute, and The Nature Conservancy, often took a less confrontational approach, making close partnership difficult. However, these groups and RAN had a shared commitment to conservation and thus worked together on a more limited set of issues, such as promoting certified wood products or criticizing Bush Administration policies.

¹⁴ See page 15 for a description of tax status.

¹⁵ Green Corps had historically been politically aggressive but had not promoted civil disobedience.

NGOs addressing the same concerns sometimes found themselves on opposite sides. In the Old Growth Campaign environmentalists and logging companies battled over which of two groups should certify wood as coming from forests managed with certain minimum social, environmental, and conservation practices. Two certification systems were established. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was supported by RAN, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and other NGOs. The Sustainable Forestry Institute (SFI) was supported by the logging industry. Advisors to the SFI included Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy, much to chagrin of other environmental organizations. Brune said the SFI was like “the fox guarding the henhouse.”¹⁶

Because of RAN’s limited resources, however, partnering with another NGO could be useful. In its most recent campaign, Jumpstart Ford, RAN partnered with Global Exchange. Global Exchange was one of several NGOs targeting Ford, including the Sierra Club and the Bluewater Network. Although partnering with a large organization such as the Sierra Club might have given RAN more negotiating power, Global Exchange had strategies and goals closer to RAN’s. NGOs with large membership had to be sensitive to their own branding.

Training

Training was important to prevent activists from getting hurt and ensure that campaign activities were carried out without negatively affecting the public perception of RAN. RAN offered training to staff and volunteers, and it contracted with the Ruckus Society to coordinate some of its activist training camps.¹⁷ Ruckus was an independent organization that trained individuals and local groups to protest. RAN worked closely with Ruckus, and several of RAN’s staff were Ruckus trainers. Training provided by Ruckus helped RAN with high-profile direct actions or acts of civil disobedience, such as banner hangs and blockades. Training included tactics for non-violent acts of civil disobedience, earning media coverage, fundraising, grassroots organizing, facilitation, delivering meaningful sound bites, climbing buildings for banners hangs, calming angry protestors, dealing with nervous police, and conducting surveillance.¹⁸

Civil disobedience—such as scaling buildings, chaining oneself to the doors of a bank branch with U-locks or Kryptonite chains, and blocking entrances with concrete filled barrels—was usually conducted by employees of RAN, the Ruckus Society, or most often by volunteer activists trained by RAN or Ruckus. Such activities were not always controlled by RAN—for instance, a student group in Illinois that decided to shut down local Home Depot stores on a Saturday may have told RAN about their plans or may have done it autonomously, possibly without proper training.

¹⁶ Efforts to reduce support for SFI were organized under the <http://www.dontbuysfi.com/> website.

¹⁷ RAN typically paid the Ruckus Society \$5,000 to \$10,000 for a training camp.

¹⁸ <http://www.ruckus.org/training/>, May 10, 2004; David Postman, “Protestors hit training camp to prepare for WTO meeting,” *The Seattle Times*, September 20, 1999.

COMPETENCIES

Targets as Assets

Once RAN achieved success with a target, the target sometimes acted as an ally. During the Old Growth Campaign, after Lowe's had agreed to stop sourcing old growth products, Lowe's hosted meetings between RAN and Boise Cascade to help move those negotiations along. Kinko's stopped purchasing from Boise Cascade. Also, a target could have an incentive to spread RAN's policies throughout the industry. Citigroup's CEO Charles Prince offered to call Bank of America and Chase on behalf of RAN. Brune said, "RAN's power base is not the size of our member base, but our wins with Home Depot, Lowe's, Boise Cascade, Citigroup, and others. We have a non-traditional source of power because Home Depot and the others act as surrogates or partners."

RAN also occasionally received assistance from employees of the target who were sympathetic to its campaign goals. A Home Depot employee gave RAN the intercom code used in all its stores. Brune and others went into stores, entered the intercom code, and recorded messages such as "Lumber from old growth forests is on sale on Aisle 3," or "Tropical lauan from the habitat of the orangutan and Sumatran tiger on sale on Aisle 4." The intercom system provided an opportunity to review a message before it was broadcast. Activists thus could be gone with their shopping carts before the message was broadcast or could be in another aisle recording another message, making it difficult for Home Depot personnel to find them. This was repeated by dozens of activists in stores across the United States.

Budget

RAN's budget had been relatively constant for years, in the \$2 to \$3 million range. In 2002 revenue was \$2.3 million and expenses were \$2.2 million (Exhibit 5). Over half of RAN's income went for staff; over one quarter for additional campaign expenses; and the remainder covered overhead and administrative expenses. Although needs varied, about \$1 million per year was needed per campaign. RAN's budget increased to \$2.4 million for 2004 and Brune expected it to reach \$5 million over the next five years. To meet its budget growth, RAN had to boost its fundraising.

Fundraising

RAN raised funds from membership dues, wealthy donors, and grants from foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust, Educational Foundation of America, Tides Foundation, and Wallace Global Fund (see Exhibit 6). RAN did not accept contributions from its targets or from corporations, with the exception of "friends of RAN," which included small businesses with environmentally friendly policies.

With its existing resources, RAN was stretched to run three campaigns. James Gollin, chair of RAN's board, said "On a scale of 1 to 10, RAN is an 11 or 12 in goal achievement, but only a 3 for fundraising—RAN has a great product, but does not have a representative amount of the dollars raised for environmental work." Gollin was not sure this was a problem, however. More money would enable RAN to run more campaigns, pay for more ads, and train more protestors, but Gollin thought RAN was successful in part because it was lean, mean, and focused on campaigns about which it felt strongly.

RAN received \$308,000 in membership dues in 2002. Membership and donations jumped at the end of 2003 and the first part of 2004 as a result of the Boise Cascade and Citigroup victories. RAN attempted to attract more members through direct mail and the Internet and received lists of potential members from other NGOs, such as the Sierra Club.

Staff and Volunteers

In 2004 RAN had about two dozen employees, all in the United States. RAN's staff was organized into four departments: operations, development (fundraising), communications, and campaigns. Within the campaigns department, RAN typically had a director for each campaign and used an organizing staff of about five to support the campaigns collectively. To supplement its limited resources, RAN relied on volunteers. RAN did not have a lawyer on its staff and relied on pro bono lawyers for legal work and for representing arrested staff members.

Although RAN was located in the U.S., its reach was broader. RAN was allied with local groups in other countries that would report on activities such as harvesting rainforests. RAN put that information, along with pictures, on its websites. Activist groups in other countries also joined in Days of Action.

RAN'S BOARDS AND DIRECTORS

Board of Directors

RAN's board of directors oversaw the organization—choosing the executive director, directing and supporting the general mission, supporting fundraising efforts, helping with some negotiations, and offering campaign ideas. The board was generally hands-off, meeting once a quarter, and delegated day-to-day activities, including staffing, to the executive director. Some board members filled specific functional roles, such as finance, accounting, governance, and communications. Other board members were more general strategists and idea generators.

Board members were usually consulted in some stages of negotiations with campaign targets. Brune and the campaign director typically sent the first and last drafts of negotiation agreements to the board. In addition, Brune worked closely with three or four board members discussing the negotiations and strategies as campaigns progressed. Draft corporate policies and campaign strategies were sent to the board for input, but not for approval.

Honorary Directors and Advisory Board

In addition to the board of directors, RAN had honorary directors and an advisory board. Honorary directors were celebrities who supported RAN but did not have formal responsibilities. They showed their support by, for instance, making public appearances at RAN-sponsored events. Honorary directors included Bonnie Rait, who had engaged in civil disobedience on the Boise Cascade campaign and wrote letters to corporate targets, and John Densmore, former drummer for the Doors, who solicited media attention. The advisory board consisted of members of the scientific community, many of whom held PhDs. In its early years, RAN sought advice on scientific matters from the board, but by 2004 RAN seldom sought their advice.

MEASURING SUCCESS—WHEN CAN RAN DECLARE A VICTORY?

At the beginning of a campaign RAN laid out demands and the goals it hoped to achieve. RAN typically declared victory and praised the target company not when all of the goals were achieved, but when significant and notable progress was made. RAN wanted to reward steps in the right direction, occasionally to the chagrin of more radical activists.

For example, in late 2003 after months of negotiations in the Global Finance Campaign, Citigroup agreed to a new set of policies regarding its financing in extractive industries in natural habitats. Those policies did not meet RAN's initial set of demands, particularly regarding climate, but the policies were a definite step in the right direction. After some painful internal deliberations, RAN decided to accept Citigroup's new policies and declare a victory. Brune said, "We were asking for a big bite, so to be fair and reasonable we rewarded them once they started fixing their policies. But we didn't stop there. As we congratulated them, we laid out the next steps for them."

MONITORING AND ENFORCING AGREEMENTS

Since an agreement between RAN and a target was not legally enforceable, RAN relied on the threat of resuming its campaign if the company did not adhere to its new policies or continue to make the needed improvements. To date, RAN had not restarted a campaign against any of its targets.

Monitoring of agreements was performed differently for each campaign. For the old growth campaign RAN trained local volunteers to spot old growth lumber in Home Depot stores. These volunteers periodically walked up and down stores aisles to examine the lumber and reported back to RAN if they found old growth products. Monitoring of the Citigroup agreement was quite different. Citigroup agreed to publish an annual Corporate Citizenship Report and report quarterly to RAN on the implementation of its policies, including providing proprietary data.

SELECTING THE AGENDA

In spring 2003 RAN launched a campaign—the Clean Car Campaign, beginning with Jumpstart Ford—that was seemingly far from its mission to protect rainforests.

Jumpstart Ford

In May 2003, RAN and Global Exchange wrote to CEO Bill Ford stating that the United States had a fuel addiction and that the Ford Motor Company was harming the climate, forests, and national security (Exhibit 1). RAN asked Ford to attain an average fleet fuel economy of 50 miles per gallon by 2010 and stop producing vehicles that emitted greenhouse gases at the tailpipe by 2020. RAN recognized that the federal government would not significantly increase fuel economy standards, so it turned to private politics.

RAN hired Jacob Harold as an independent contractor for three months to launch the Jumpstart Ford campaign, culminating with Ford's 100th anniversary shareholder meeting on June 16, 2003. Harold created marketing materials, worked to build a network and relationships with other NGOs targeting Ford, met with ex-Ford insiders to learn the dynamics of the organization, organized activities to coincide with Ford's shareholder meeting, and developed a two to three-

year campaign strategy. Some of the activities RAN organized included a banner hang (in which Ruckus assisted and a number of activists were arrested) at Ford's 100th anniversary celebration festivities in Dearborn. Across the street from Ford's celebrations they inflated a 100-foot dinosaur with the slogan, "I love guzzling gas." RAN also organized a small protest and handed out of thousands of flyers that illustrated a 25 miles per gallon Model T and a 12 miles per gallon Ford Expedition. Harold also met with Ford personnel and spoke at Ford's annual meeting questioning Bill Ford and the board on fuel economy. After the meeting, Ford's chief of security thanked Harold for his professionalism.

When Harold's contract expired, RAN's campaign efforts slowed. RAN was busy transitioning to its new executive director, negotiating with targets on both the Old Growth and Global Finance Campaigns, and launching a mission and strategy review. By early 2004, RAN resumed preparations for its Jumpstart Ford campaign—the campaign was expected to be fully staffed by June 2004 and was anticipated to last at least five years. RAN expected to take the campaign to other companies once it achieved success with Ford.

Target Selection

When RAN decided to target an automaker for contributing to global climate change, it considered Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. Ford was selected for a number of reasons. Naming Bill Ford personally was viewed as an advantage, since it gave him the opportunity to become a hero—Bill Ford thought of himself as both an industrialist and an environmentalist.¹⁹ Ford also had broken a promise to improve SUV fuel economy by 25 percent by mid-decade, and according to Brune the company had the worst fuel economy of any of the world's major automakers. (Ford was dealing with financial problems, so fuel economy may have taken a back seat.) Ford was also the target of other NGOs, such as the Sierra Club, Bluewater Network, and Global Exchange, among others, and RAN believed that multiple voices, demands, and strategies would help. Ford also had a concentrated brand, unlike GM. Brand targeting was a key part of RAN's strategy, and communicating with the public on all of GM's brands, Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Cadillac, GMC, Oldsmobile, Saturn, Hummer, and Saab, would have been difficult.

Differences Between Jumpstart Ford and Previous RAN Campaigns

In the Jumpstart Ford campaign, RAN decided, for the first time, to partner with another NGO—Global Exchange. Both had similar sets of demands and strategies, and each brought different strengths to the partnership. RAN had more expertise with Days of Action and working with Ruckus. Global Exchange offered better graphics expertise and had more experience with geopolitical stability, human rights, and labor issues (important because of the impact of the UAW at Ford). Both shared in the strategy development and writing. If and when Ford agreed to start discussions and negotiations, both RAN and Global Exchange expected to be at the table.

NGOs Targeting Ford

The NGOs targeting Ford had different strategies and goals, and although they shared thoughts on the campaigns, they stopped short of integrating their strategies. RAN, for example, talked frequently with the Sierra Club and the Bluewater Network about their campaign plans but did not join in campaign activities.

¹⁹ "Bill Ford Jr.; Calling the boss to account," *Star-Tribune Metro*, February 18, 2004.

Strategy Review

RAN's Mission Statement and Strategy Review

RAN was founded with the goal of protecting tropical rainforests. Over time, its campaigns expanded to include temperate rainforests (e.g., in British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest) and old growth forests, some of which were not rainforests (e.g., public lands in Idaho and Montana, or national forests in the Rocky Mountains). As RAN's campaign scope broadened beyond forests with the Jumpstart Ford campaign, the board and Brune reviewed its mission statement and strategy. Brune said:

We were considering expanding the mission statement to state that RAN's primary strategy is to transform the global marketplace in order to preserve forests and their inhabitants; and also to expand beyond forests to include all natural systems that sustain life, whether it be clean air, clean water, or climate. So although RAN would be rooted in forests, RAN would also look at other issues that might have a long-term impact on forests.

Review Process

To guide the strategy and mission statement review, RAN surveyed about 25 close partners, allies, and even "enemies" of RAN (some corporations), interviewed most of RAN's staff and board, and had a board/staff retreat.²⁰ The goal of the review was to identify the essence of RAN and design a new mission statement and strategy to reflect that essence. Brune wanted not only to update the mission statement to reflect RAN's current work, but to look ahead to the next 10 years and encompass future work that might be broader in scope—to enable RAN to work on climate and energy issues in a manner consistent with its core competencies and reflecting the threat of climate change to rainforests and other ecosystems.

CHALLENGES

Finding Opportunities

RAN's biggest challenge would be picking future campaigns for which RAN could have significant impact. Klein said, "The easy targets are disappearing." As a result, RAN was broadening its mission to allow for evolution.

Jumpstart Ford

What RAN and Global Exchange asked of Ford was considerably more aggressive than what RAN had asked of companies in the Old Growth and Global Finance Campaigns. While the demands were believed to be technologically feasible, they were very demanding economically—some might say impossible. Ford already faced financial problems and was struggling to sell more cars. RAN's campaign position was that Ford could not afford not to make changes—RAN tried to tie Ford's fiscal health to its environmental performance. Brune said, "In order not to lose market share to Japanese automakers, Ford will have to innovate and produce cars that are more compelling to the public. Hybrid engines should not just be a niche market, but should be incorporated into all engines." Ford planned to market an Escape SUV

²⁰ The survey showed that RAN's staff cared most about global warming.

hybrid in 2004, but a hybrid generally cost \$3,000 to \$5,000 more than a car with a standard engine.

House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight Investigation

Nonprofit organizations were either 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) organizations.²¹ 501(c)(3) organizations were tax-exempt, and donations to them were tax-deductible by the donors. These organizations included charities, schools, and hospitals, with missions to educate and provide services to the public. The 501(c)(4) category was used for organizations that lobbied. They were also tax-exempt, but donations to them were not tax-deductible by donors.²²

The Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise (CDFE) and the Frontiers of Freedom Institute (FFI) portrayed RAN as an anti-capitalist attack group that used intimidation, force, and unlawful actions and should therefore have its 501(c)(3) tax status revoked.²³ Starting in 2001, (coinciding with RAN's actions against Boise Cascade as part of the Old Growth Campaign), the CDFE and FFI asked the IRS to review RAN's tax status.

As a result of the CDFE and FFI efforts, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight subpoenaed RAN at the end of 2003, demanding all emails, newspaper articles, board minutes, website entries, and press releases. RAN complied but blacked-out the names and addresses of individuals. Brune said, "Nonviolent direct action is in RAN's mission statement. We decided it wasn't effective to fight the subpoena and are anxious to make our case that civil disobedience should be embraced as a vital part of a democratic society."²⁴ Addressing this issue took time and money, neither of which RAN had in abundance. The subcommittee was considering whether organizations that performed acts of civil disobedience should be eligible for any tax benefit status—including both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4). Revocation of 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) tax statuses would be devastating to NGOs involved in civil disobedience, including RAN.

High Turnover

Brune said, "Turnover is high at RAN, but has been better in the last year. Still, half of our staff will be gone by the time the Ford campaign is done." The high turnover was not unique to RAN. Staff members at cause-related NGOs tended to work hard and immerse themselves emotionally in their work, which often resulted in burnout and required breaks from work. Turnover was also a function of demographics—NGO staff members tended to be young, in their 20s or early 30s, and life changes such as marriage or graduate school often led to resignations or movements from one NGO to another. In addition, Brune said, "NGOs tend to pay barely enough money for staff to afford beer, pizza, and a couch in a friend's apartment." RAN tried to improve the lifestyle of its employees and reduce turnover by raising wages, improving healthcare, and instituting family leaves, among other practices.

²¹ RAN, Greenpeace, and The Nature Conservancy were 501(c)(3) organizations. The Sierra Club had given up its 501(c)(3) status, opting for a 501(c)(4) status instead, since it lobbied government and endorsed candidates for public offices.

²² "Logging Giant Boise Cascade and Anti-Environment Activists on the Attack Against Rainforest Action Network," RAN Press Release, June 21, 2001.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ellen Komp, "Rainforest Action Network Targeted in Congressional Probe," <http://www.civilliberties.org/RAN.html>, May 10, 2004.

Protesting Post-September 11

An additional challenge for RAN was continuing to carry out forceful, nonviolent acts of civil disobedience without alarming the general public in the post-September 11 environment. For example, RAN had considered a banner hang at Citigroup's headquarters in New York City in the fall of 2001. Banner hangs involved activists with backpacks crawling up the sides of buildings. Given the increased security concerns post-September 11, RAN decided against that particular banner hang. The greater security concerns and the Patriot Act also made some activists wary of developing an FBI file.

PREPARATION QUESTIONS

1. Should RAN expand its mission to include any additional issues such as agribusiness, water, climate, corporate responsibility and power, genetically modified organisms, overall levels of consumption, etc.? If so, how should RAN attract new funding? Should it raise funds using the Internet as moveon.org had successfully done? Re-instating chapters or forming affiliates would present a management hurdle, but should RAN use offshoot organizations to grow membership and dues and boost fundraising? Might a larger membership be a more conservative membership?
2. What has made RAN and its strategy effective? What changes, if any, should it make in its strategy? If RAN expanded its mission or changed its strategy, what additional competencies should it build?
3. Should RAN focus on its current campaign structure and add greater capacity or build a larger structure focusing on pressuring markets to bring the world closer to sustainability? In building a larger framework, would RAN be able to bring along its historical allies?
4. Given the long time horizon of its campaigns and its limited number of campaigns, target selection was crucial for RAN. Was Ford a good target for RAN? What should RAN do if Ford agrees that fuel economy should be improved but states it can only achieve 35 miles per gallon, still far ahead of the industry?
5. As CEO of a potential target, should you take preemptive steps to avoid targeting by RAN or one of its peers? What types of steps?

Exhibit 1
RAN and Global Exchange's Letter to Bill Ford, Jr.

May 7, 2003
Mr. William Clay Ford, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Ford Motor Company
The American Road, Dearborn, MI 48120

Dear Mr. Ford:

Ford Motor Company has been a leader of American industry for almost 100 years – and now, at the cusp of your centennial, we ask you to lead once more.

Right now, a patriotic American seeking to embrace energy independence by purchasing a high-efficiency hybrid must turn to Japanese automakers. Ford is years behind the curve. Sadly, your recent announcement that you would break your promises on SUV fuel efficiency has only weakened Ford's position. Ford must change, not only because your company's corporate behavior is shameful to proud Americans, but also because it is devastating our climate, forests, and national security.

Our nation's dependence on oil has become an addiction. Global security is compromised. Soldiers and innocent civilians pay with their lives as the U.S. enters into military conflicts. Our economy falters at the slightest shift in oil prices. Moreover, our planet faces the colossal ecological and economic challenges created by oil exploration and climate change.

Our organizations, Rainforest Action Network (RAN) and Global Exchange (GX), are concerned about the range of consequences from our oil addiction. The world's rainforests have been among the first to pay the price for that addiction. As global demand for oil has risen, oil exploration has entered some of Earth's most fragile rainforests, leaving behind a trail of deforestation, ecosystem fragmentation, toxic waste, and oil spills. Indigenous communities from Colombia to Indonesia have watched their ancestral homes fall to the destructive force of oil extraction. In addition, forest communities and nations worldwide face the daunting threat of climate change. The next few decades will see new waves of severe weather, sea-level rise, coral reef destruction, agricultural devastation, economic instability, and species extinction. By gambling with the Earth's climate, we put our economy, environment, and public health at risk.

We are also dedicated to defending the human rights of communities around the world. In the last 10 years, military factions acting on behalf of multinational oil companies have killed more than 2,000 people in the Niger Delta. In the Indonesian province of Aceh, oil companies have provided crucial logistical support to the Indonesian army, which has tortured, kidnapped and killed community activists on or near drilling sites. In Colombia, the U.S. government is paying \$98 million to the Colombian military to guard an Occidental Petroleum oil pipeline. These units have killed 18 innocent civilians, and have yet to be held accountable for their actions. Ford will be complicit in these abuses until it helps us get off the petroleum treadmill.

And we are committed to improving national security by reducing our oil dependence. The U.S. imports 55 percent of its oil, much of it from unstable nations such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Colombia. By 2025, we will depend on other countries for 68 percent of our oil. This dependence has helped push the U.S. into conflicts around the world—most recently in Iraq—while funding repressive regimes such as the Saudi royal family. Americans cannot expect true security and safety until we break our oil addiction.

We believe, as you do, that we can build a secure, ecologically sustainable society in our lifetime. A key step is to phase out the gasoline-fired internal combustion engine. We can do that while maintaining Ford's ability to increase shareholder value, protect employees, and maintain long-term strategic and financial integrity. Ford Motor Company can seize this opportunity and perform an ecological and economic U-turn by agreeing to the following two goals:

- 1) By 2010, attain 50 mpg average fleet fuel efficiency
- 2) By 2020, stop producing any vehicles that emit greenhouse gases at the tailpipe

We do not make these requests lightly and understand that each represents a significant undertaking for your company. Other leading corporate players have recognized their role in oil dependence and are acting to change their policies and praxis. That said, the greatest burden rests on industries that create the market for oil dependence. Sadly, Ford is the face of oil addiction.

Exhibit 1 (continued)

RAN and Global Exchange's Letter to Bill Ford, Jr.

RAN and GX are available to assist your company in this transition. We have a history of working with major corporations to develop responsible environmental policies. In recent years, we have collaborated with companies ranging from Weyerhaeuser to Home Depot, from Kinko's to Centex Homes. We also work closely with the UNEP Financial Initiatives program and are committed to productive dialogue that produces meaningful progress. You may be familiar with our campaigns. Currently we are engaged in long-term public campaigns with Boise Cascade, Citigroup, Procter & Gamble, and M&M/Mars. Recently, as a result of our three-year campaign, Citigroup offered to work with us to steer its financial resources away from projects that destroy forests and contribute to climate change. Citigroup's good-faith effort resulted in an announcement of a potential major policy shift – and a halt to our public pressure.

We wish to be honest and forthright about our intentions. Ford's recent environmental policy reversals compel us to build a coalition of human rights, environmental, public health, and peace and justice groups to target your company's customers, investors, and employees. Our hope remains that Ford will no longer stifle innovation and will begin to utilize the full range of fuel-efficient technologies. Ford can lead the American automobile industry into a new generation of automotive transport. Or, Ford can remain a dinosaur that refuses to innovate at the expense of the world's forests, our national economy, and our way of life.

We hope to work with you to face this historic challenge. We would like to offer a meeting in the next few weeks to discuss these issues in more detail. If interested, please contact RAN's Executive Director, Michael Brune at (415) 398-4404, ext. 311.

For the forests and human rights,

Randall Hayes
President
Rainforest Action Network
221 Pine St., Ste. 500
San Francisco, CA 94104

Medea Benjamin
Founding Director
Global Exchange
2017 Mission St., Ste. 303
San Francisco, CA 94110

Exhibit 2 Sample of RAN Organized Actions²⁵

OLD GROWTH CAMPAIGN

- RAN hung a five-story banner at Home Depot's headquarters.
- Activists protested at over 150 Home Depot stores simultaneously.
- RAN and hereditary leaders of the Nuxalk, an indigenous tribe from British Columbia, "ethically shoplifted"—taking wood from Home Depot stores that was "stolen" from tribal lands.
- At the convention of the National Association of Homebuilders in Dallas, RAN activists hung banners and flew inflatable chainsaws.
- RAN floated a 120 foot tall inflatable dinosaur at Boise Cascade's headquarters, with a banner reading "Boise: I Love Logging Old Growth."
- An activist dressed as Santa delivered thousands of letters from schoolchildren to Boise's CEO George Harad, asking him to grant their wish to stop logging old growth.
- RAN hung a banner in downtown Boise, Idaho, that read, "Boise: An American Disgrace."
- RAN trained more than 30 student activists to run campaigns to encourage their schools to cancel Boise Cascade contracts.
- During a national Day of Action, over 60 activist groups protested in front of Boise's largest customers, such as Blockbuster, Borders, the University of Illinois, etc.

GLOBAL FINANCE CAMPAIGN

- RAN campaigners voiced their concerns and asked questions of Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill and Citigroup's board of directors at a Citigroup annual shareholder meeting.
- RAN led a three-day brainstorming session to get campaign ideas from over 20 organizations.
- University students launched credit card and job recruitment boycotts.
- The campaign's first national Day of Action involved over 50 actions and included demonstrations, credit card cut-ups, and account divestments.
- Over a hundred students attended a spring break Ruckus camp, called "Spank the Bank." Students took Finance 101, and learned about grassroots organizing and how to conduct direct actions.
- Using U-locks, Kryptonite chains, and concrete-filled barrels, activists blocked the entrances to many Citibank branches in San Francisco.
- Thousands of letters and pictures from schoolchildren were delivered to Weill, asking him to stop funding forest destruction and global warming.
- RAN campaigners distributed campaign materials in Weill's hometown, including posters with Weill's photograph and the heading "Wanted."

²⁵ www.ran.org.

Exhibit 3
Sample of RAN's Print Advertisements

Did you know
that someone is
using your Citigroup
credit card without
your authorization?

Citigroup is using your money to fund environmental destruction around the world.


Sandy Weill
Chairman and CEO,
Citigroup, Inc.

Citigroup is an ethically bankrupt company that cannot be trusted with your money. It is the leading financier of environmentally and socially destructive logging, mining, and fossil fuel projects around the world. Citigroup uses your dollars to profit off projects that destroy endangered forests, displace local communities, and accelerate global warming. The red umbrella is behind the chainsaws and bulldozers that are destroying ancient redwoods in California's Headwaters Forest, rainforests in the Peruvian Amazon surrounding the Camisea gas project, endangered orangutan habitat

in Indonesia, and the Mindo Nambillo cloudforest in Ecuador, among others.

It's time for Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill to follow the lead of top European banks such as ABN AMRO and establish meaningful environmental and social criteria to evaluate the projects Citigroup funds. Cut up your Citi card today and tell Sandy Weill "Not with My Money" until he meets the financial industry's best practices. Because the last thing you want is an unethical bank wreaking global havoc. Especially with your credit card.

**CUT
QUICKLY**

 RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK www.ran.org • 221 Pine Street, Suite 500, San Francisco, CA 94104

Source: www.ran.org. Printed in *The New York Times*, November 2002.

Exhibit 3 (continued)
Sample of RAN's Print Advertisements



Source: www.ran.org. Printed in *The New York Times*, Winter 2000.

Exhibit 4
RAN's Ad Praising Citigroup, Printed in *The New York Times*, January 2004

THANK YOU CITIGROUP
FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY THAT HELPS PROTECT
OUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET.

WE BELIEVE that today marks the beginning of a new era in the relationship between economy and ecology. Citigroup, the world's financial leader, has adopted an environmental policy that sets a new standard in the financial services industry. "Citigroup and the Environment" introduces progressive policies to protect endangered ecosystems and address climate change, as well as investment initiatives to promote sustainable forestry and renewable energy. Citigroup's presence in 100 countries makes this one of the most far-reaching environmental commitments to date. With this policy, Citigroup recognizes that our most valuable asset is on loan to us from future generations.



Source: www.ran.org.

Exhibit 5
RAN's 2002 Financial Statement**2002 Statement of Activities and Changes in Net Assets****Support and Revenue:**

Public Support and Membership	\$	1,108,950
Grants	\$	1,083,254
Gain from Asset Disposal	\$	700
Special Events	\$	113,469
Other Income	\$	23,899
Interest Income	\$	7,027
Total Support and Revenue	\$	2,337,299

Expenses:

Program Services:

Public Education and Membership	\$	1,428,115
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Supporting Services:

Management and General	\$	311,194
Fundraising	\$	486,726
Total Expenses	\$	2,226,035

Increase in Net Assets	\$	111,264
Net Assets at Beginning of Year	\$	1,048,009
Net Assets at End of Year	\$	1,159,273

Exhibit 6
Large Donations to RAN in 2002**Panthers—\$100,000 & UP**

Anonymous
Ford Foundation
Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust
Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Spirit Bears—\$30,000-99,999

Brad Gelineau
Educational Foundation of America
JMG Foundation
Tides Foundation
W. Alton Jones Foundation
Working Assets

Source: Rainforest Action Network Annual Report 2002.